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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
GINA A. POLEDNA,
Claimant/Appellant,
Supreme Court No. 42220
V.

THORNE RESEARCH, INC.
Employer/Respondent,
and
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho
Gina A. Poledna
c/o Mark B. Jones #4589
IV. 1rney a: Law
P.O. Box 579
Sandpoint, ID 83864
THORNE RESEARCH, INC.
P.O. Box 25
Dover, ID 83825-0025
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN
Idaho Department of Labor
317 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83735
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Gina A. Poledna (Poledna), Claimant/Appellant, applied for
unemployment insurance benefits, which were denied by the Idaho Department of
Labor (IDOL). The IDOL Appeals Examiner denied a subsequent Appeal, finding that
"Claimant voluntarily quit a job without good cause connected with employment" and

that the "Employer's account is not chargeable for experience rating purposes!'
The claim was appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, which denied the
appeal on May 19, 2014, making the Decision and Order a final Order under Idaho
Code 72-1368(7).
The Appellant now seeks relief from the Court.
BACKGROUND/FACTS

Poledna was a iong time employee of Thorne Research, Inc., (Thorne), starting
employment with Thorne as a production worker in May 2002. 1
Begining in 2007, Poledna began experiencing wrist pain, which she felt was
caused by work related activity at Thome. Poledna sought medical treatment from Dr.
Di Benedetto at that time. Eventually, the wrist problem resolved to the point she
returned to work with a wrist brace.

2

By November of 2013, Poledna was experiencing severe bilateral pain in her
wrists, and she again sought medical treatment. She received a diagnosis of bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome. Her orthopedist, Dr. Di Benedetto, stated in his treatment

1

Agency Record, page 2

2Agency

Record, page 2

notes that work made her pain worse, and caused her harm.
After learning of the diagnosis, and realizing that cont!nuing work in her present

capacity wouid aggravate her wrist condition, Poledna sought accommodation from
Thorne which would allow her to work with the manipulative restrictions presented by
her medical condition. The request for accommodation was denied, and Thorne told
Poledna they did not have any other work available. Poledna left employment with

Thorne after they refused accommodation, and thereafter she filed for unemployment
benefits, which were denied. 3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has limited jurisdiction in this matter as set out in Idaho Code 72-732
and 72-733, et al. Pursuant to Idaho Code 72-732, the Court may only affirm or set
aside the Decision and Order upon the following grounds:
(1) The Commission's findings of fact are not based on substantial
competent evidence;
(2) The commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers;
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud;
(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
(1.)

The Commission's Decision and Order issued in this matter is not based on
substantial competent evidence, as the Order is void of a description of the job
performed by Poledna, does not set forth or consider the physical requirements

Transcript pages 6-8, 11-13

3
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necessary to perform Poledna's job, does not identify, discuss, or consider the
manipulative requirements necessary to perform Po!edna's job, does not
consider how Poledna's work hours would effect her ability to perform the
unidentified job, nor does it consider or discuss all of these facts in combination
to determine if Poledna had "good cause" for leaving employment.
(2.)

The Commission's Decision and Order failed to recognize that Poledna had
Statutory "good cause" under IDAPA Rule 09.01 .30.450, for leaving her
employment.

(3.)

The findings of fact are not supported as a matter of law as the Decision and

Order found that the "Claimant voluntarily quit a job without good cause
connected with employment."

Appellant's Brief 6

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION AND ORDER ISSUED IN THIS MATTER IS NOT
BASED ON SUBSTANTiAL COMPETENT EViDENCE.

The IDOL Appeals Examiner denied the Appeal finding that "Claimant voluntarily
quit a job without good cause connected with employment" and that the "Employer's
account is not chargeable for experience rating purposes." 4
The Examiner/Commission determined that Poledna "voluntarily quit a job
without good cause connected to employment" 5 without ever knowing what job Poledna
performed, the physical requirements necessary to perform this job, and what is most
important, the manipulative requirements necessary to perform the job.
With all due respect to both the Examiner and the Commission, the Decision and

Order are fundamentally defective, as they fail to identify, discuss or consider:
(1.) The job performed by Poledna,
(2.) The physical requirement necessary to perform Poledna's job,

(3.), The manipulative requirements necessary to perform Poiedna's job.
Lacking this basic knowledge, how could the Examiner/Commission determine
Poledna quit without "good cause?"
The Commission had Poledna's medical records. How could any reasonable
person then determine someone could perform a job without some basic job description
and some basic understanding of the physical requirements needed to preform the job?
The Commission determined that the "Claimant worked in the bottling and
labeling departments over the span of her career. Her duties included setting up

'4 Agency
5

Record page 1

Agency Record page 26
.Appellant's Brief 7

machines, cleaning, putting labels on products and boxing them. She worked between
36 and 44 hours per week." 6 This statement is the only description of the job Po!edna
performed at Thorne.
There is clear unmistakable error on the face of the Decision and Order, as the
Decision is completely silent and void of any discussion of what job Poledna performed
at Thorne. It is impossible to determine that Poledna could do her job, without knowing
what her job was, or to determine that she had quit without "good cause."
It is impossible to determine someone can perform a job without knowing the
physical requirements necessary to perform it. A job description with some information

about physical demands is the starting point for any analysis of whether someone has
the physical capacities to perform a job. Without some basic understanding of what the
job is to be performed, the Commission is making a determination with no basis in fact.
It is guessing Poledna could do the job.
How much weight did Poledna lift? Was there overhead reaching? Was Poledna
twisting or bending her wrists? If so, how often, what percentage of the day? Did her job
require fine finger dexterity? Was Poledna performing production work, and if so was
there an expected rate of production?

Because the Commission knew Poledna has documented manipuiative
restrictions, understanding and discussing the manipulative requirements of the job

Poledna performed is critical to the analysis of whether she could perform the job.
Again, no information was obtained and no discussion was made in the Decision and

6

Agency Record page 21
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Order as to what manipulative requirements were necessary to perform the job. This
means that the Commission had no basis in fact when it determined that Po!edna "quit"
without good cause. This means that the Examiner and the Commission had to guess
or assume what Poledna was doing at Thorne.
Obtaining a job description was critical to the analysis of whether Poledna could
perform her job when contrasted against what her doctor said, and what Poledna
testified to. A basic job description is the standard by which all other evidence was to be
compared and judged, especially the medical evidence and testimony of Poledna. The
failure to obtain and discuss Poledna's job description meant no other reasonable
analysis could be made of the other evidence of record. It is a fatal flaw in the Decision

and Order, which leaves everything else up to speculation.
Finally, the testimony of record, which is not disputed, is that Poledna was
working at Thorne three (3) 12 hour days, then an 8-hour day, with some overtime. 7
Poledna's work schedule was also a factor which needed to be considered and
contrasted against the physical requirements of her job as she was working 12 hour
days. This schedule required Poledna to perform an additional four hours of work (when
compared to a normal work day) and limited her "down time" (time off from work)
between work days. In other words, she had significantly less time between the end of
her shift and the start of the next shift during the three 12 hour day periods. This would
allow for substantially less physical recovery time between shifts. While the schedule is
of record, it is not considered or discussed in the Decision and Order. It is, in and of

7
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itself, a significant factor in considering whether Poledna had "good cause" for quitting.

THE DECISION AND ORDER FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT POLEDNA HAD
STATUTORY "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER IDAPA RULE 09.01.30.450 FOR QUITTING
HER EMPLOYMENT.
It is undisputed that Poledna has manipulative restrictions, as evidenced by the
medical records contained in the record, and as discussed by the Commission. The
Commission did not dispute the severity of the limitations, nor did they dispute any of

Poledna's allegations concerning her manipulative limitations. It is also undisputed that
Poledna approached Thorne about accommodating her manipulative limitations, which
they refused to do. There is no evidence to the contrary.

Poledna testified that she sought accommodation from Thorne, but they told her
that there was "no light duty positions availab!e." 8
Even the Examiner seems to accept Poledna's testimony, stating "Okay. So,
there isn't another job for - - that they had for you to do at Thorne Research, but my
question still is why not go find another job with another employer wbile you still
continue to work?" 9 But the answer is clear, she had no work to return to at Thorne.
Thorne knew Poledna had manipulative limitations which prevented her from continuing
performance of her existing job. When Thorne refused to accommodate her medical
condition, and refused to place her into other work, they effected a constructive firing,
Thome knew Poledna was unable to continue, and when they refused to

accommodate, they knew she could not continue at her present job. Thorne created an

6

Transcript page 12-13

9
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impossible employment situation for Poiedna, and had to know this when it refused
accommodation. Thome got rid of Polenda by refusing accommodation.
The Commission in the Decision and Order cites Edwards v. Independence
Serv., Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104 P.3d 954, 957 (2004) stating "If a ciaimant
voluntarily quits, the claimant bears the burden of proving, by preponderance of the
evidence, thats/he quit for "good cause." The Commission then cites Edwards stating

"A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that, when weighed with that opposed to
it, has more convincing force and from which a greater probability of truth results." k!. At
916, 104 P3d at 958.
In this matter, there is no opposing evidence to suggest that anything other than

what Po!edna testified to had occurred. Poledna presented with a medical condition and
sought accommodation or a change in duties which Thorne refused. By virtue of
Thorne's refusal to accommodate or change her position, they knew Poledna had no
choice but to leave employment.
And what if Poledna had stayed, as suggested by the Examiner? Staying was
not only physically impossible, but presented Poledna with the very real possibility that
she wouid be terminated for cause (poor work performance) if she remained at Thorne.
Being terminated "for cause" could restrict or limit unemployment benefits. 10 If Polectna
stayed at Thorne, as suggested by the examiner, she faced the very real possibility of

being disqualified for unemployment benefits, if she were to be fired for cause.
Poledna needs only show this Court that she had "good cause" for quitting

Generally, if an employee is tenninated for misconduct, they can be denied
unemployment benefits.
10
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employment with Thorne.
The Idaho Administrative Code, u:1der section 09.01 .30.450 defines "good
cause" when an employee quits work. This section states in part:
01. Burden of Proof
The claimant has the burden of proof to establish that he voluntarily left his
employment with good cause in connection with the employment to be eligible
for benefits. (3-19-99)
02. Cause Connected with Employment
To be connected with employment, a claimant's reason(s) for leaving the
employment must arise from the working conditions, job tasks, or employment
agreement. If the claimant's reason(s) for leaving the employment arise from
personal/non job-related matters, the reasons are not connected with the
claimant's employment (3-19-99)
03. Good Cause
The standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of reasonableness
as applied to the average man or woman. Whether good cause is present
depends upon whether a reasonable person would consider the circumstances
resulting in the claimant's unemployment to be real, substantial, and compelling.
05. Quit Due to Health or Physical Condition
A claimant whose unemployment is due to his health or physical condition which
makes it impossible for him to continue to perform the duties of the job shall be
deemed to have quit work with good cause connected with employment.
In this case, Poledna had a documented medical condition, which the employer
refused to accommodate. Thorne also refused to move her or change her job duties.
Poledna could not continue performing the job at Thorne due to her manipulative
restrictions. She either had to continue performing this job, or quit. She had no other

choice. Thorne was well aware that she had prior wrist issues and a prior worker
compensation claim. The Commission was aware of this too. Poledna did the right thing
seeking accommodation or a position change. When Thorne refused, she had no
choice but to quit. Poledna had "good cause" as set out in IDAPA 09.01 .30.450.05.

Po!ed~3 did not h2 11e 2 vi2b!e option a,,:_::;ilablp, h8ving been refused
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accommodation by Thorne. 11 Poledna explored her options with Thorne and had none.
Poiedna therefore had "good cause'' for !eaving employment.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED AS A MATTER OF LAW AS THE
DECISION AND ORDER FOUND THAT THE "CLAIMANT VOLUNTARILY QUIT A
JOB WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE CONNECTED WITH EMPLOYMENT."

The Commission determined in the Decision and Order that "The only medical
evidence in the record was provided by the claimant's own doctor, who did not
recommend that the claimant take time off from work; did not recommend that the
claimant change occupations; and did not recommend that the claimant discontinue
working." 12
The Commission does not dispute that Poiedna has bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome.
The Commission had in its possession the notes of Dr. Di Benedetto, an
orthopedic surgeon, dated December 13, 2013, which states "\Ne discussed options
including carpal tunnel release, continuing with her symptomatology and iiving with the
pain, or trying a change in activities. I explained to her I do think that because she feels
her pain is made \Norse v,1hile at work, then she clearly is having pain related to work. I
explained l am dubious that her insurance carrier at work is likely to find this to be
completely associated with work as the only cause. Her question was pretty straight
forward, which was: Does work cause her pain to get worse and does it cause her

Higgins v. Larrv Miller Subaru Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 4-5, 175 P.3d 163, 166-167
(2007), requires the employee explore other options than quitting.
11

12

Agency Record page 10
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harm? I believe the answer is yes. She will consider her options. She will contact me if
she has any further questions." (Emphasis added).
The evidence of record is that orthopedist Dr. Di Benedetto opined that Poledna
has bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. that it causes Poledna pain, that it is made worse
by work activities, and that it causes her harm. Further, Dr. Di Benedetto is clearly
leaving the decision of what to do up to Poledna as stated in his notes of December 13,

2013.
Poledna presented evidence of a documented medical condition, which her
orthopedist felt was made worse by work and which ''caused her harm." She sought
accommodation with her employer which was refused. She sought a job change which
was refused by Thorne. Poledna's orthopedist clearly left the decision up to Poledna.
Faced with continuing in a job that made her hurt and "caused her harm," Poledna took
the only option left for her, which was

to leave employment.

The~ Decision and Order are not supported by law as Poledna demonstrated that
she could no longer continue at Thorne in her present job. A claimant whose
unemployment is due to his health or physical condition which makes it impossible for
him to continue to perform the duties of the job shall be deemed to have quit work with

good cause connected with employment.
If the Commission argues that she could work, how can they make this
argument, with no job description or analysis of what physical requirements, especially
manipulative, were expected of Poledna? How can the Commission say Poledna could
de her :cb v.'hen thev dc~'t even kno't! or 2n2!,J1ze \A/hat that her ,;ob
,I

.,

\A/8S?

Anrl nhviouslv

there could be no rational analysis of the facts absent some understanding of what
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.,

,

Po!edna did at Thorne. The Decision and Order are therefore not supported in the !aw
as Po!edna had "good cause" for leaving employment. The Commission cannot argue
otherv11ise as they have no basis in fact for their finds as they don't even know what

Poledna did at Thorne. Therefore, the entire Decision and Order is not based in law.
SUMMATION OF ANALYSIS
The Commission found that Poledna did not have "good cause" for leaving her
employment. Yet the Commission did not have Poledna's job description, nor any

information about the physical or manipulative requirements necessary to perform her
job. Some understanding of what was physically required of Poledna was absolutely

necessary to determine if she had "good cause" for leaving employment. Some
information about the physical and manipulative requirements were absolutely
necessary as the description of the requirements are what all other information (medical
documentation and testimony) are judged against. What substantial competent
evidence did the Commission possess when it didn't know what-Poledna was actually
doing at Thorne? What foundation does the Commission have in any of its arguments
without some understanding of the job? How can the findings be based on critical
analysis when there is no foundational description of the work with which to reason

with?
Absent some understanding of what Poledna was doing at Thorne, the
Commission is guessing, and therefore the Decision and Order cannot be based on
substantial competent evidence as required by !aw.

Ruie 09.01 .30.450.
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The record supports that Poledna had a documented medical condition. The
records also supports that she sought accommodation from Thorne, or a job change,
both of which were refused by Thorne. Poledna was experiencing pain and the work
was causing her harm, based on the opinion of her orthopedist, in her current position.
Poledna sought and explored her options, which were to continue working in pain,
which caused her harm, or to quit. No other option existed. Poledna therefore had
"good cause under the IDAPA for leaving employment.

Finally, the Decision and Order cannot be based in law, when Poledna had
"good cause" for quitting, as set out under the IDAPA. Further, with no understanding of

what Poledna was doing in her employment, as more fully set out in the first issue, the
Decision and Order cannot be based in law.
The Decision and Order cou!d not be based in law when a critical piece of
information was missing.

CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT
We would respectfully ask the Court to reverse the Decision and Order entered in this
matter and to award Unemployment Benefits to Poledna, subject her qualification. In
the alternative, we would ask the Court to remand the matter for further processing.

REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
Counsel would ask for an award of any costs and attorney fees that may be
awarded under Idaho Law, for the reasons set forth in this brief.

I

1
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! hereby certify that on this 2k_ day of September 2014, I served tvvo (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Thorne Research, Inc
P.O. Box 25
Dover, ID 83825-0025
Tracey K. Rolfsen
Idaho Department of Labor
317 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83735
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